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FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION
UNDER THE CALIFORNIA
CONSTITUTION
JOSEPH R. GRODIN*
M ost of us, when we want to refer to constitutional protection for
expressive activity, refer to our "First Amendment rights." But
when delegates to the first California constitutional convention gathered
in Monterey in 1849 to draft a Declaration of Rights, the First Amendment
was not a subject of discussion. Not only had the First Amendment never
been interpreted by the U.S. Supreme Court, at that time the federal Bill of
Associate Justice of the California Supreme Court, 1982-1987; Distinguished
Emeritus Professor, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; coauthor
with Calvin Massey and Richard Cunningham of THE CALIFORNIA STATE CONSTITU-
TION (Oxford Univ. Press 2011) (1993). The author has published numerous articles on
the subject of state constitutions, including The California Supreme Court and State
Constitutional Rights: The Early Years, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 141 (2004). For more
general treatment, with references to other books and articles about state constitution-
alism nationwide, see ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITU-
TIONS (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
This article is intended to be the first in a series on rights and liberties under the
California Constitution, focusing primarily on areas in which the state Constitution
has been interpreted, or is subject to being interpreted, as providing greater protection
than the federal Constitution. The author appreciates the helpful suggestions he re-
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Rights had no application to the states.1 Instead, in drafting what became
the first article of the Constitution, the delegates chose as models primarily
the constitutions of New York and Iowa; and while most state constitutions
had similar provisions relating to freedom of speech, it was the New York
Constitution of 1846 that provided the text.2 Article I, section 9 of Califor-
nia's first constitution read:
Every citizen may freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right; and
no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech
or of the press. In all criminal prosecutions on indictments for li-
bels, the truth may be given in evidence to the jury; and if it shall
appear to the jury that the matter charged as libellous is true, and
was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the party
shall be acquitted; and the jury shall have the right to determine
the law and the fact.
And section 10 read:
The people shall have the right freely to assemble together, to con-
sult for the common good, to instruct their representatives, and to
petition the legislature for redress of grievances.
The language of sections 9 and 10 was incorporated without change
into the Constitution of 1879, and has survived with only minor changes.
In 1974, section 9 was renumbered as section 2, and in 1980 it became sec-
tion 2(a), supplemented by a provision creating a newspersons' privilege
that became section 2(b).3 Section 2(a) now reads:
1 Barron v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
2 The language in the 1846 New York Constitution derived in turn from earlier
constitutions in New York, and from earlier constitutions in other states. For discus-
sion of the history and its significance to interpretation, see Christian G. Fritz, More
Than Shreds and Patches: California's First Bill of Rights, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 13
(1989); Jennifer Friesen, Should California's Constitutional Guarantees of Individual
Rights Apply Against Private Actors?, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 111 (1989); Margaret C.
Crosby, New Frontiers: Individual Rights Under the California Constitution, 17 HAST-
INGS CONST. L.Q. 81 (1989). See also the extensive discussion by the California Supreme
Court in Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 24 Cal.4th 468 (2000).
3 See infra Section VII.
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Every person may freely speak, write and publish his or her senti-
ments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right.
A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.
Section 10 was renumbered as section 3 in 1974, then as section 3(a) in
2004. It was changed in 1974 to read:
The people have the right to instruct their representatives, petition
government for redress of grievances, and assemble freely to con-
sult for the common good.
It was to be expected, notwithstanding the independent origins of the
free speech and assembly provisions of the California Constitution, that
their interpretation would be influenced over time by the First Amend-
ment and its interpretation by the U.S. Supreme Court. This article's prin-
cipal undertaking, however, is a description of the ways in which inter-
pretation by California courts of the state constitutional provisions has
given rise to a somewhat different jurisprudence, providing protections for
expressive activity and association beyond the First Amendment. Toward
the end of the article, I will discuss the justification for and methodology
of such a distinctive state approach.
I. EARLY CASES
The year was 1893; the place was a courtroom in San Jos6. The case was
Price v. Price, a hotly contested divorce proceeding, and the evidence (ac-
cording to the lawyers) "would probably be of a filthy nature." The trial
judge - anxious, he said, to protect decorum and public sensitivity - is-
sued an order closing the courtroom to members of the public and direct-
ing that "no public report or publication of any character of the testimony
in the case be made."
Charles Shortridge,4 the editor and publisher of the San Jose Mercury,
promptly violated the court's order by publishing the next day what pur-
ported to be the testimony of the witnesses. Appearing in response to an
4 Charles was part of an illustrious family that came to California from Iowa and
that included his sister, Clara Shortridge Foltz, the first woman lawyer in California,
and brother, Samuel Shortridge, who later became U.S. senator from California. See
BARBARA BABCOCK, WOMAN LAWYER: THE TRIALS OF CLARA FOLTZ (2011).
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order to show cause why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt of
court, Shortridge said he meant no disrespect; he was simply exercising his
constitutional right of free speech. Found guilty and ordered to pay a $100
fine, Shortridge sought relief through writ of habeas corpus in the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court, thereby giving rise to the first appellate decision on
free speech rights under the state Constitution.5
Deciding in favor of Shortridge, the Court understandably made no
mention of the federal Constitution or the First Amendment. In 1833 the
U.S. Supreme Court had decided in Barron v. Baltimore that the federal
Bill of Rights had no application to the states;6 and it was not until 1908,
in Twining v. New Jersey, that the Court suggested it was "possible that
some of the personal eight Amendments against National action may also
be safeguarded against state action, because a denial of them would be a
denial of due process of law."' 7 At the time Shortridge was decided, there
was no authority for the proposition that the First Amendment might be
among the amendments thus incorporated. Indeed, that authority did not
exist until years later, when the U.S. Supreme Court in Gitlow v. New York,
in the process of upholding Gitlow's conviction, grudgingly conceded that
"[flor present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and
of the press ... are among the fundamental personal rights and 'liberties'
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.... ,,8
And so it was that the Shortridge court spoke instead about state con-
stitutions:
The constitution of every state in the Union guarantees to every
citizen the right to freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments
on all subjects, and prohibits the passage of any law "to restrain
or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." What one may
lawfully speak he may lawfully write and publish. The rights thus
preserved by the constitution are dear to the heart of every Ameri-
can, and their exercise can be complained of by the courts in a
5 In re Shortridge, 99 Cal. 526 (1893).
6 Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833).
7 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908).
8 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
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summary proceeding only when the publication or the speech in-
terferes with the proper performance of judicial duty.9
The Court acknowledged but dismissed the English common law prec-
edents which found the publication of even truthful accounts of pending
cases to be contempt of court, saying,
[P]recedents promulgated at a time when the ministers of the crown
claimed and exercised the right to seize a newspaper and stifle the
voice of its editor, when books were destroyed and speeches sup-
pressed to subserve political purposes, are of little value in this age,
and especially in this country.10
The Court instead relied on Cooley's Constitutional Limitations for the
proposition that the constitutional liberty "implies the right to freely utter
and publish whatever the citizens may please, and be protected against any
responsibility for so doing.., so long as it is not harmful in its character
when tested by such standards as the law affords."'" While a newspaper
has "no right to assail litigants during the progress of a trial, intimidate
witnesses, dictate verdicts or judgments, or spread before juries its opinion
of the merits of cases which are on trial," the Supreme Court said, Short-
ridge's article did not exceed these limitations, and the trial court's order
was void. 1 2
While the Court's reasoning in Shortridge seemed to invoke a gen-
eral constitutional right existing beyond the language of any particular
constitution, the Court's next free speech opinion was more narrowly fo-
cused. The events which gave rise to that focus, however, were far from
narrow. In 1895, San Francisco was embroiled in a sensational murder trial
which attracted nationwide attention. 13 A medical student by the name of
9 Shortridge, 99 Cal. at 533.
10 Id. at 535.
11 Id. (citing THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITA-
TIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN
UNION (1868)).
12 Id.
13 The case was followed in the pages of the NEW YORK TIMES (e.g., Lunatic Tries
To Kill Durrant: Rushes at Him as the Man Accused of Murder Entered the Court, Aug. 5,
1895); BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE (e.g., Durrant and Miss Williams (Apr. 23, 1895), Dam-
aging to the Pastor (Apr. 25, 1895), Police Stop the Play (July 30, 1895), Durrant Writes
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Theodore Durrant was accused of committing a pair of grisly murders in
the Emmanuel Baptist Church in San Francisco. At his preliminary hear-
ing damaging circumstantial evidence was produced, including somewhat
dubious eyewitness testimony that placed Durrant in the vicinity of the
church the night of the murders.
While the jurors were being selected for the trial, an entrepreneur by
the name of William R. Dailey undertook to produce a play (The Crime of
a Century) at the Alcazar Theater in San Francisco, based on the testimo-
ny at the preliminary hearing plus some imagination. Durrant's counsel,
claiming that the production of the play during trial "would be an interfer-
ence with the administration of justice, and deprive [Durrant] of a fair and
impartial trial,"' 4 asked Judge Murphy, the trial judge, to issue an order
prohibiting the production. He did, but the production went on anyway, in
defiance of the order. According to one account, "A great crowd attended
the performance, which was hissed at intervals." In the middle of the third
act, "[j]ust at the point when Debois, the character who is supposed to im-
personate Durrant, was about to drag a woman to the belfry of a church,
Sheriff Whelan and his deputies marched on the stage and arrrested the
performers, eleven in all. The manager of the theater [Dailey] was also
placed under arrest.... The whole company spent the night in jail." 15
The next morning Dailey and the actors appeared in court. Judge Mur-
phy found Dailey in contempt of his order, and sentenced him to three
days in jail. The actors were released, based on their promise not to appear
further in the production. Dailey sought relief through extraordinary writ
in the California Supreme Court, invoking the free speech provision of the
state Constitution, then article I, section 9.
a Book (Nov. 6, 1895), and Durrant Resentenced (Apr. 11, 1897), available at http://af-
flictor.com/2011/06/12/old-print-articles-the-durrant-murder-case-brooklyn-daily-
eagle-1895-99/; as well as in San Francisco's EXAMINER (e.g., July 14, 1895) and CALL
(e.g., July 30, 1895). The descriptions of the events are taken from these articles, as well
as from the appellate court's opinion.
14 Dailey v. Super. Ct., 112 Cal. 94, 96 (1896). The concern was apparently well
founded: newspaper accounts tell us that the first forty veniremen were disqualified for
bias. The prosecutor joined in the request.
15 Police Stop the Play, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, July 30, 1895, available at http://
afflictor.com/2011/06/12/old-print-articles-the-durrant-murder-case-brooklyn-daily-
eagle-1895-99/.
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The Court, in a 6-1 opinion by Justice Garroutte, held that the superior
court's order was "an attempted infringement upon the rights guaranteed
to every citizen by section 9":
The wording of this section is terse and vigorous, and its meaning
so plain that construction is not needed. The right of the citizen to
freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments is unlimited, but he is
responsible at the hands of the law for an abuse of that right.... It is
patent that this right to speak, write, and publish, cannot be abused
until it is exercised, and before it is exercised there can be no re-
sponsibility. The purpose of this provision of the constitution was
the abolishment of censorship, and for courts to act as censors is
directly violative of that purpose. This provision of the constitution
as to freedom of speech varies somewhat from that of the Constitu-
tion of the United States, and also more or less from the provisions
of many state constitutions treating of this question; but, if there is
a material difference in the various provisions, it works no harm to
this petitioner, for the provision here considered is the broader, and
gives him greater liberty in the exercise of the right granted.... The
[superior] court had ample power to protect itself in the adminis-
tration of justice after the contempt was committed. As to the of-
fender, it could punish him; as to the defendant on trial, he could be
deprived of no rights by any act of this petitioner. If the publication
deprived him of a fair and impartial trial at that time, a second trial
would have been awarded him.1 6
Consequently, the trial court's order was annulled.' 7 Durrant was con-
victed anyway, and hanged, despite evidence that the pastor of the church
may have been the culprit.
While Dailey stands as an early confirmation of the independent status
of state constitutional rights, the holding in that case, insofar as it seems
to prohibit any injunction against speech, has since been modified. 18 And
16 Id. at 97-100.
17 Id. at 100.
18 See Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 21 Cal.4th 121 (1999) (permissible to enjoin
repetition of speech found to be unlawful, distinguishing Dailey on the ground that
the speech in that case had not been determined to be unlawful before the injunction
issued).
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the opinion's implication, contrary to the broad language in Shortridge,
that the free speech provision of the California Constitution protects only
against prior restraints, leaving the government unlimited power to im-
pose sanctions upon expression, has since been rejected - not, however,
before it was allowed to cause considerable damage.
1I. THE RED SCARE CASES
In 1919 the California Legislature, responding to a national "Red Scare"
which followed in the aftermath of World War I, enacted the Criminal
Syndicalism Act. 19 The statute defined "criminal syndicalism" as "any
doctrine or precept advocating, teaching, or aiding and abetting the com-
mission of crime, sabotage. . . or unlawful acts of force and violence or
unlawful methods of terrorism as a means of accomplishing a change in
industrial ownership or control, or effecting any political change ... "
Anyone who advocated, encouraged, or "justified" criminal syndicalism,
or who assisted in the organization of a society to teach, aid or abet crimi-
nal syndicalism, was guilty of a crime.
A principal target of the Criminal Syndicalism Act was the Industrial
Workers of the World (IWW), a radical labor organization widely accused
of promoting "anarchy." In 1921 the California Supreme Court upheld the
conviction of Nick Steelik, on the basis of evidence that he was a member of
and organizer for the IWW, and that he "personally advocated revolution
and preached some of the doctrines denounced as criminal in the act. '" 20
Rejecting Steelik's argument that the statute violated his "right of free speech
guaranteed in the federal and state Constitutions," the Court declaimed,
The right of free speech was guaranteed to prevent legislation which
would by censorship, injunction, or other method prevent the free
publication by any citizen of anything that he deemed it was neces-
sary to say or publish.. . . The right of free speech does not include
the right to advocate the destruction or overthrow of government
or the criminal destruction of property... . It is expressly provided
in our constitution that the publisher is liable for an abuse of this
19 1919 Cal. Stat. 281 (repealed).
20 People v. Steelik, 187 Cal. 361 (1921); STEPHEN M. KOHN, AMERICAN POLITICAL
PRISONERS: PROSECUTIONS UNDER THE ESPIONAGE AND SEDITION ACTS 167 (1994).
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power and for any unlawful publication. This statute does not pre-
vent the publication; it punishes the publisher .... 21
By the time Steelik was decided, the U.S. Supreme Court had embarked,
for the first time, upon the development of First Amendment jurisprudence,
with its seminal decisions upholding convictions for subversive advocacy
under the federal Espionage Act of 1917.22 It is therefore interesting that the
Steelik court made no reference to these cases - perhaps because at the time,
and until the U.S. Supreme Court's 1925 decision in Gitlow v. New York,23
there was no authority for the proposition that the First Amendment applied
to the states at all. The Gitlow court, while establishing that states are limited
by the First Amendment, nevertheless upheld New York's "criminal anar-
chy" statute, which was quite similar to the statute in California. And two
years later, in Whitney v. California, the Court upheld California's Criminal
Syndicalism Act against First Amendment challenge, over a strong dissent
by Justices Brandeis and Holmes. 24 It did so, however, not on the reasoning
of Steelik, but on the broader ground that the statute was within the "police
power" of the state to protect against dangers to public peace and security.25
Nine years after Steelik, the California Supreme Court was confront-
ed with another case involving subversive advocacy, this time under the
state's "red flag law."' 26 Adopted at about the same time as the Syndicalism
Act, the law made it a felony to display a red flag in any public place "as a
sign, symbol or emblem of opposition to organized government or as an
21 Id. at 375. For good measure, the Court went on to say, not very convincingly,
that Steelik was in any event "not in a position to raise the point, for he is not charged
with or convicted of a violation ... involving anything that he said or published.. 
Id.
22 See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (opinion by Holmes, J.); Frohwerk
v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919) (opinion by Holmes, J.); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616 (1919) (Holmes and Brandeis, JJ., dissenting). In Schenck, Justice Holmes,
who had previously expressed the view that freedom of expression was protected only
against prior restraints, acknowledged that "[i]t well may be that the prohibition of laws
abridging the freedom of speech is not confined to previous restraints, although to pre-
vent them may have been the main purpose.... 249 U.S. at 51-52.
23 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
24 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
25 Id. at 371-72.
26 Stromberg v. People of California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931); CAL. PENAL CODE § 403a
(repealed 1933).
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invitation or stimulus to anarchistic action or as an aid to propaganda that
is of a seditious character." Yetta Stromberg, age nineteen, was one of the
supervisors at a summer camp for children between the ages of ten and
fifteen, in the foothills of the San Bernardino Mountains. A member of the
Young Communist League, an international organization affiliated with
the Communist Party, Stromberg supervised a daily ceremony directing
the children to raise a red flag, apparently a reproduction of the flag of the
Communist Party of the United States. As part of the ritual, the children
saluted and recited a pledge of allegiance "to the workers' red flag, and to
the cause for which it stands, one aim throughout our lives, freedom for
the working class." Stromberg was convicted of violating the statute.
The Court of Appeal upheld her conviction, as against the claim that
the statute violated both the First Amendment and article I, section 9 of the
California Constitution, 27 on the ground that the definition of "sedition"
under the statute included advocacy of violent overthrow of government,
and there was evidence that Stromberg did engage in such advocacy.
28
The California Supreme Court declined to hear the case, but the U.S. Su-
preme Court granted certiorari and reversed. 29 While giving lip service to
Whitney and Gitlow, it found the California statute, to use modern First
Amendment language, unconstitutionally overbroad. 30 Twenty years later,
in the context of another "red scare," the U.S. Supreme Court pronounced
Whitney and Gitlow legally dead, and explicitly adopted the "clear and
present danger" test long advocated by Holmes and Brandeis. 31
27 This should not be taken as criticism of the lawyers, lest I be caught in my
own critique. See Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal.2d 51 (1967),
in which I put forth and the Court accepted a First Amendment claim on behalf of
Women for Peace, who wished to place an ad on AC Transit buses. I doubt that my
briefs mentioned the California Constitution, nor did the Court's opinion, though it
was written by Justice Mosk, normally a strong proponent of independent state analy-
sis. See also infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.
28 People v. Mintz, 106 Cal.App. 725, 731 (1930). Bella Mintz was one of three
codefendants. The Court of Appeal reversed the convictions of defendants other than
Stromberg on the basis that there was no allegation or proof of an overt act. The Court
of Appeal issued two opinions, one of them by a judge assigned pro tern and the other
by the two permanent justices of the court.
29 Stromberg, 282 U.S. 359.
30 Id. at 369.
31 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
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III. THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION
IN HIDING
For several decades after Stromberg, the free speech provision of the Cali-
fornia Constitution seemed to go into hiding. This was not because there
were no free speech cases that reached the California courts. Many did. But
typically the courts would discuss the cases in terms of First Amendment
law without mentioning the California Constitution at all. Or if they did
mention it, they relegated it to a secondary position without independent
analysis, finding the challenged governmental action to be valid or invalid
on the basis of the First Amendment and then adding something like "and
the result is the same under the California Constitution."
There are a number of possible explanations. During this period the
U.S. Supreme Court was developing a substantial body of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence, and lawyers invoking a constitutional claim against
governmental action restrictive of speech turned naturally to those prec-
edents. Even when lawyers did put forth a claim based on the state Consti-
tution, it was easier for courts to rely on First Amendment analysis than to
engage in the development of an independent state jurisprudence.3 2
All this was illogical, as Hans Linde of Oregon pointed out in an in-
fluential article,33 arguing that a state could not be said to deprive a person
of due process under the federal Constitution through action that was in-
valid under the state's own constitution. 34 It was, moreover, contrary to the
principle of judicial restraint reflected in the doctrine that a court should
not consider the constitutional validity of a statute if through reasonable
interpretation the constitutional question could be avoided. And, reliance
upon the federal Constitution to invalidate state action could prove to
32 As ajudge I was probably on occasion guilty of that sin as well.
33 Hans A. Linde, First Things First: Rediscovering the States' Bills of Rights, 9 U.
BALT. L. REV. 379, 383 (1980). The practice of tagging on to federal interpretation con-
tinues in a number of free speech areas. See, e.g., Keenan v. Super. Ct., 27 Cal.4th 413,
435-36 (2002) (holding California's "Son of Sam" law unconstitutional under First
Amendment precedent and concluding that it also violated article I, section 2, because
"neither party suggests any reason why it should provide lesser protection under the
circumstances of this case").
34 The Ninth Circuit follows Linde's advice, holding that federal courts "should
avoid adjudication of federal constitutional claims when alternative state grounds are
available." Vernon v. City of L.A., 27 F.3d 1385, 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1994).
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be embarrassing if the U.S. Supreme Court did not agree. But as Holmes
taught us, the life of the law is not necessarily logic.
Perspectives on the relationship between the state and federal consti-
tutions in areas other than free speech began to change in the 1950s, when
the California Supreme Court, at a time when federal law did not require
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, decided in People v. Cahan that
evidence obtained in violation of the state Constitution was inadmissible
in a criminal proceeding. 35 The trend picked up in 1972, when the Court
held California's death penalty statute unconstitutional in People v. An-
derson.36 In the same year, the state Constitution was amended to add an
explicit right of privacy 37 as well as an explicit statement of state constitu-
tional independence: "Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not de-
pendent on those guaranteed by the United States Constitution."38 Finally,
in 1979, the Court broke with federal precedent in the area of free speech.
IV. EXPRESSIVE ACTIVITY ON PRIVATE
PROPERTY: PRUNEYARD AND ITS PROGENY
"The Pruneyard ' 39 is the name of a typical large shopping center in San
Jos6, with some twenty-one acres containing shops, restaurants, and a cin-
ema connected by roads, walkways, and plazas, bordered on two sides by
public sidewalks and streets. One Saturday afternoon in the late 1970s a
group of high school students appeared at Pruneyard's central courtyard,
set up a card table in the corner, and proceeded to solicit passersby for their
signatures to a petition to be sent to the White House expressing their op-
position to a United Nations resolution against "Zionism." The students
were informed by Pruneyard security personnel that their activity violated
Pruneyard regulations prohibiting public expressive activity unrelated
35 People v. Cahan, 44 Cal.2d 434 (1955); see also Cardenas v. Super. Ct., 56 Cal.2d
273 (1961) (holding that although the defendant's mistrial did not place him in jeopardy
under the federal Constitution, "his jeopardy is real" under the Court's construction of
the California Constitution).
36 People v. Anderson, 6 Cal.3d 628 (1972).
37 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1.
38 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 24. The section goes on to state: "This declaration of rights
may not be construed to impair or deny others retained by the people."
39 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal.3d 899 (1979).
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to the commercial purposes of the shopping center, The students left,
and sued.
The status of shopping centers in relation to the First Amendment had,
prior to Pruneyard, a checkered history in the U.S. Supreme Court. Ini-
tially that Court, by extension of its holding in Marsh v. Alabama that a
company-owned town could not exclude Jehovah's Witnesses who wished
to distribute literature on its sidewalks, 40 held in Amalgamated Food Em-
ployees v. Logan Valley Plaza that a privately owned shopping center could
not preclude striking workers from picketing a store within it.4 ' Without
directly addressing the "state action" requirement for applying the federal
Bill of Rights, the Court stated:
[B]ecause the shopping center serves as the community business
block "and is freely accessible and open to the people in the area
and those passing through," the State may not delegate the power,
through the use of its trespass laws, wholly to exclude those mem-
bers of the public wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights
on the premises in a manner and for a purpose generally conso-
nant with the use to which the property is actually put.42
A few years later, however, in Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, involving anti-Vietnam
War protestors, the Court held that Logan Valley Plaza did not apply to
speech that was unrelated to the business of the shopping center.43 Finally,
in Hudgens v. National Labor Relations Board the Court, emphasizing that
"the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a guarantee only against
abridgment by government," rejected the distinction advanced in Lloyd on
the ground that it was content based. 44 The Court expressly overruled Lo-
gan Valley Plaza and held that "the constitutional guarantee of free expres-
sion has no part to play in a case such as this." 45
Meanwhile, before its decision in Pruneyard the California Supreme
Court had on four occasions upheld a right to expression on private
40 Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
41 Amalgamated Food Emp. Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308
(1968) [hereinafter Logan Valley Plaza].
42 Id. at 319-20 (quoting Marsh, 326 U.S. at 508).
43 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551, 563-64 (1972).
44 Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 513, 520 (1976).
45 Id. at 521.
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property. In Schwartz-Torrance Investment Corp. v. Bakery & Confection-
ery Workers' Union the Court, presaging the U.S. Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Logan Valley Plaza, held on the basis of balancing the right of free
expression against property rights, that a shopping center was not entitled
to an injunction excluding a union from picketing a business within the
center.46 In In re Hoffman, the Court held that anti-Vietnam War protes-
tors had a constitutional right to distribute leaflets within Union Station in
Los Angeles, though it was owned by three railroads,47 and that a munici-
pal ordinance purporting to prohibit such activity was invalid.48 In In re
Lane the Court held that a union representative had a constitutional right
to pass out handbills on a privately owned sidewalk leading from a parking
lot to the Calico Market in Concord, a large "super-market-type" grocery
store with whom the union had a dispute.49 And in its initial decision in
Diamond v. Bland (Diamond I) the Court relied on these precedents and
the federal cases to hold that People's Lobby, an environmental organiza-
tion, had a constitutional right to solicit signatures on initiative petitions
inside a shopping mall, and ordered the trial court to enjoin the shopping
mall owner from interfering with that right.50
Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Hudgens, however, the
mall owner in Diamond v. Bland sought and obtained a dissolution of the
injunction on the ground that Hudgens had undermined the reasoning in
Diamond I and had established a federally protected constitutional prop-
erty right on the part of a shopping center or mall to exclude expressive
activity if it wished.51 And in a 4-3 decision (Diamond II), the California
46 Schwartz-Torrance Inv. Corp. v. Bakery & Confectionery Workers' Union, Lo-
cal No. 31, 61 Cal.2d 766 (1964).
47 In re Hoffman, 67 Cal.2d 845 (1967). The fact that Union Station was privately
owned was not emphasized or separately analyzed in the Court's opinion, which fo-
cused instead upon whether the activity interfered with the operation of the facility.
48 Id. at 853-54. The ordinance made it unlawful for any person "to loaf or loiter
in any waiting room, lobby, or other portion of any railway station.., airport, or bus
depot . . .or to remain in any such [place] longer than reasonably necessary to transact
such business as such person may have to transact ...." The Court characterized the
ordinance as "defin[ing] the law of trespass applicable to this situation."
49 In re Lane, 71 Cal.2d 872 (1969).
50 Diamond v. Bland (Diamond I), 3 Cal.3d 653 (1970).
51 Diamond v. Bland (Diamond 11), 11 Cal.3d 331, 333 (1974).
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Supreme Court agreed.5 2 After Hudgens it was clear that the First Amend-
ment did not protect the People's Lobby in gathering signatures, and it was
also clear, said the majority, that they could not derive protection from the
liberty of speech clauses of the California Constitution because the state
Constitution could not be used to deprive the owners of their federally
protected property interest.5 3
This, then, was the legal background to Pruneyard. If Diamond II was
still good law, the students who sought to distribute handbills inside the
Pruneyard shopping center would lose. But the composition of the Cali-
fornia Court had changed by 1979, and in a 4-3 opinion by the recently ap-
pointed Justice Newman, joined by Chief Justice Bird and Justices Tobriner
and Mosk - both of whom had dissented in Diamond II - the Court held
that the Diamond II majority was wrong in refusing to take the California
Constitution into account. 54 The Court said the U.S. Supreme Court's de-
cision in Hudgens ought not be interpreted to preclude a state from defin-
ing property rights in such a way as to accommodate state-protected rights
of expression; on the basis of the California Constitution, the students had
a right to do what they were doing.55
In reaching this conclusion the Court relied upon evidence showing
the growth in importance of suburban shopping centers as a place where
large numbers of people gather, and hence their potential as a forum for
communication; 56 upon the distinctive language of article I, section 2
("Though the framers could have adopted the federal Bill of Rights they
chose not to do so"); 57 upon the right to petition in article I, section 3;58
and upon the Court's prior opinion in Diamond I. While acknowledging
52 Id. at 335.
53 Id. at 334-35.
54 Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal.3d 899 (1979).
55 Id. at 905-06, 910.
56 Id. at 907.
57 Id. at 908. While the Court in Pruneyard did not identify the significance of
differences in text between the state and federal constitutions, it had occasion to do so
later, in Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, observing that "article I's free speech clause,
unlike the First Amendment's, specifies a 'right' to freedom of speech explicitly and
not merely by implication ... and does not merely safeguard some such right against
encroachment." 24 Cal.4th 468, 491-92 (2000).
58 Pruneyard, 23 Cal.3d at 907. Article I, section 3 declares the right of people to
"petition government for redress of grievances." In California, the Court observed, this
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that the Court in Diamond I "relied partly on federal law," the Court said,
"California precedents [i.e., Schwartz-Torrance, Lane, and Hoffman] were
also cited [and] [t]he fact that those opinions cited federal law that sub-
sequently took a divergent course does not diminish their usefulness as
precedent.... The duty of this court is to help determine what 'liberty of
speech' means in California. Federal principles are relevant but not con-
clusive so long as federal rights are protected."5 9 Overruling Diamond II,
the Court held that "sections 2 and 3 of article I of the California Consti-
tution protect speech and petitioning, reasonably exercised, in shopping
centers even when the centers are privately owned. 60
The Court went on to elaborate on the "reasonably exercised" quali-
fication: the right recognized by the opinion could be limited by "time,
place, and manner rules," and quoting from Justice Mosk's dissent in Dia-
mond II, it would not necessarily apply to "an individual homeowner or
the proprietor of a modest retail establishment... A handful of additional
orderly persons soliciting signatures and distributing handbills in con-
nection therewith, under reasonable regulations adopted by defendant to
assure that these activities do not interfere with normal business opera-
tions... would not markedly dilute defendant's property rights."61
Pruneyard's initial holding - that the federal Constitution did not
preclude states from requiring shopping center owners to accommodate
reasonable rights of free expression - was quickly validated by the U.S.
Supreme Court. Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Pruneyard Shopping
Center v. Robins confirmed that the high court's reasoning in Lloyd "does
not ex proprio vigore limit the authority of the State to exercise its police
power or its sovereign right to adopt in its own Constitution individual lib-
erties more expansive than those conferred by the Federal Constitution,"
and that, given the allowance for limitations acknowledged by the Califor-
nia Court's opinion, there was no "taking" of property in violation of the
Fifth Amendment or deprivation of property without due process of law.62
right is "vital to a basic process in the state's constitutional scheme - direct initiation
of change by the citizenry through initiative, referendum, and recall." Id. at 907-08.
59 Id. at 908-09 (citations omitted).
60 Id. at 910.
61 Id. at 910-11.
62 Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 81, 83-84 (1980).
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Questions remained, however, as to the scope of the Pruneyard prin-
ciple under California law, and answering those questions was complicated
by the fact that the Court's opinion in Pruneyard is unclear as to the basis
for its holding. Did the Court mean to say that because of the difference in
language between the First Amendment ("Congress shall make no law")
and the language of the California Constitution ("Every person may freely
speak"), there is no "state action" requirement for application of article I,
section 2? Or did it mean to say that there is a state action requirement,
but it is more easily met than under federal law? 63 If, as the Court said
in Pruneyard, that case would not necessarily apply to a homeowner or
a modest retail establishment, was that because there would be no "state
action," or for some other reason, perhaps because the public importance
of allowing free communication on the premises was outweighed by the
owner's interests in restricting access? Would the answers to these ques-
tions depend upon who was speaking to whom? Or would that inquiry be
precluded by the First Amendment as content based? And finally, where
the Pruneyard principle did apply, would the reasonableness of time, place,
and manner restrictions be assessed by the same standards that would ap-
ply in a public forum, or, because private property interests are implicated,
would different standards apply?
For over a decade the Court of Appeal grappled with these questions
without guidance from the Supreme Court. Without directly confronting
the "state action" issue, Court of Appeal opinions denied application of
63 Before Pruneyard, the California Court read prior U.S. Supreme Court cases
as finding "state action" in the shopping center's refusal to permit the exercise of "First
Amendment rights in such areas as sidewalks, parks, and malls." Diamond v. Bland, 3
Cal.3d 653 at 666 n.4 (1970). Of course, the state acts when its judicial branch issues an
injunction, and in other areas of the law, even the U.S. Supreme Court has found state
action on the basis of judicial action to enforce common law rules. E.g., Shelley v. Krae-
mer, 334 U.S. 1, 15 (1948) (state action found in judicial enforcement of restrictive cov-
enant); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (state action found in
judicial enforcement of tort law); Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 668 (1991)
(state action found in enforcement of promissory estoppel doctrine). That Court has
stopped short of finding state action in the enforcement of trespass laws generally. Bell
v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226 (1964); but see id. at 252-60 (Douglas, J., concurring). This
remains a murky area under federal law, and a fertile area for the development of a
more coherent jurisprudence under the state Constitution. Cf Intel Corp. v. Hamidi, 30
Cal.4th 1342 (2003) (considering but not deciding the state action issue).
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Pruneyard in cases involving access by abortion opponents to the property
of medical clinics where abortions were being performed, on the ground
that such property was not generally open to the public;64 access to a bank,
on the ground that it was the sort of "modest retail establishment" men-
tioned in Pruneyard;65 and access by a signature-gatherer to patrons enter-
ing and exiting the Trader Joe's store in Santa Rosa, on the basis of a bal-
ancing test: Trader Joe's interests in preventing such activity were stronger
than in the case of a shopping mall owner because it invites people to come
and shop, not "to meet friends, to eat, to rest, or to be entertained"; and
the public's interest in allowing free expression was not so strong because
Trader Joe's, as a stand-alone facility, was "not a public meeting place and
society has no special interest in using it as such. ' 66 Other cases involved
time, place, and manner restrictions adopted by shopping center malls.67
The Supreme Court consistently denied review in these cases until, in
1999, it agreed to review a Court of Appeal decision involving the Golden
Gateway Center, a large apartment complex in San Francisco, which sought
the assistance of the courts in enforcing a rule prohibiting any solicitation
or leafleting within the building except as specifically requested by a ten-
ant.68 The Tenants Association, formed by a group of tenants, had been ac-
customed to distributing newsletters to tenants by placing them at or under
their apartment doors, and it continued to do that even after new manage-
ment adopted the no-distribution rule. The Association maintained that it
had both a contractual and a state constitutional right to continue what it had
been doing. The trial court denied the injunction based on the Association's
contract theory, but the Court of Appeal decided in favor of the Center on
both grounds, concluding that the California free speech provisions, like the
First Amendment, required state action for their application. 69 The Supreme
64 E.g., Allred v. Harris, 14 Cal.App.4th 1386 (1993) and cases cited.
65 Bank of Stockton v. Church of Soldiers, 44 Cal.App.4th 1623, 1629-30 (1996).
66 Trader Joe's Co. v. Progressive Campaigns, 73 Cal.App.4th 425, 433 (1999).
67 E.g., Savage v. Trammell Crow Co., 223 Cal.App.3d 1562 (1990) (prohibition
against placing leaflets on parked cars to prevent litter and traffic problems is appropri-
ate place restriction).
68 Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Assn., 26 Cal.4th 1013 (2001).
69 Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Assn., 87 Cal.Rptr.2d 22
(1999).
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Court affirmed, 70 but did so through a set of opinions which left the issue,
and for that matter Pruneyard itself, very much in doubt.
While the Golden Gateway case was pending for decision, the Supreme
Court decided Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons.71 Gerawan involved a com-
pletely different issue - whether a statutory requirement for contributions
to an industry publicity fund violated constitutional principles against
"compelled speech" - but in the course of emphasizing differences be-
tween the state and federal protections for free expression, the Court, in an
opinion by Justice Mosk, expressed through dicta an expansive view of ar-
ticle I, section 2(a): "[A]rticle I's right to freedom of speech, unlike the First
Amendment's, is unbounded in range. It runs against the world, including
private parties as well as governmental actors."
72
Three dissenting justices in Golden Gateway,73 including one sitting
by assignment, picked up on this language and concluded, based on the
wording of article I, section 2 together with its application in Pruneyard,
that the dictum in Gerawan was a correct statement of the law. 74 This did
not mean, in their view, that there were no limits on the application of ar-
ticle I, section 2(a) but, rather, that in a particular context the Court "must
balance the private and societal interests in the speech against any com-
peting constitutional concerns"; on that balance, the Tenants Association
deserved to prevail.75 Moreover, in their view, the Center's ban on distribu-
tion could not be maintained as a time, place, and manner restriction be-
cause, even assuming it was content neutral, it was overly broad and failed
to leave open ample alternative channels of communication.
76
Three other justices77 were of the view that state action is a necessary
predicate for the application of article I, section 2(a), and disavowed the lan-
guage of Gerawan as ill-considered dicta.78 While the language of section
70 Golden Gateway Ctr., 26 Cal.4th 1013.
71 Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 24 Cal.4th 468 (2000).
72 Id. at 492.
73 Justices Werdegar, Kennard, and Klein (the latter by assignment from the Court
of Appeal).
74 Golden Gateway, 26 Cal.4th at 1045.
75 Id. at 1049, 1053.
76 Id. at 1050-51.
77 Justices Brown, Baxter, and Chin.
78 Golden Gateway, 26 Cal.4th at 1029.
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2(a) contains no explicit state action requirement, the history underly-
ing New York's analogous provision, from which the California provision
derived, reflects an understanding that it was designed to protect against
governmental interference with speech, and the history of the California
provision reveals no different intent. 79 Pruneyard should be viewed as a
determination that for purposes of the California Constitution state ac-
tion exists where the property in question is "freely and openly accessible
to the public," and thus serves as the functional equivalent of a traditional
public forum.80 Since Golden Gateway limits access to residential tenants
and their invitees, Pruneyard did not apply.81
Chief Justice George supplied the deciding vote, but on grounds which
explicitly left the state action question unresolved. It was unnecessary, in his
view, to determine the applicability of article I, section 2(a) because even if
it did apply the landlord may "prohibit[] the tenants association from leav-
ing unsolicited pamphlets on or under the hallway doors of fellow tenants,
or in a pile for the taking in the hallway."8 2 His opinion went on to say that
if and when the Court was called upon to decide the state action question,
"it will be helpful to consider the diverse circumstances in which the free
speech clause might be implicated," indicating that he had in mind "circum-
stances in which a private person or entity may attempt to utilize its power
or authority in one sphere to censor or undermine what might be viewed as
another individual's 'core' free speech rights."83 Further delineation of the
scope of article I, section 2 could be left for another day.
Seven years later, the state action issue still unresolved, the California
Supreme Court accepted an invitation from the federal Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia to clarify the applicability of Prune-
yard to a situation in which a labor union, pursuant to a dispute with one of
the tenants in Fashion Valley Mall, sought through picketing and handbills
79 Id. at 1025-28.
80 Id. at 1033.
81 Id. at 1031.
82 Id. at 1041 (George, C.J., concurring).
83 Id. at 1042. As examples, he pointed to a landlord who, using the threat of evic-
tion, limits or requires the expression of political views by tenants through campaign
posters, or a union or employer who seeks to prohibit bumper stickers on vehicles in
parking lots, or prohibiting or requiring other political activity. Id.
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to urge customers to boycott the tenant.8 4 The mall owner argued that
Pruneyard should not apply to calls for a boycott because such expression
is inimical to the purposes for which the public space was created.8 5 Three
justices of the California Supreme Court agreed; indeed, they would have
gone further and overruled Pruneyard altogether.8 6 The majority, however,
including Chief Justice George, reconfirmed Pruneyard, reconfirmed the
independent and broader protection for expression in the California Con-
stitution, and applied the same standards it would apply if the space were
publicly owned: the distinction the mall owner sought to make was con-
tent based, and therefore subject to strict scrutiny, which it could not sur-
vive.87 The fact that the union's activity might result in economic harm to
the mall and its tenants did not rise to the level of a compelling interest.
88
The Court's decision in Fashion Valley Mall provides scant basis for
determining the applicability of Pruneyard outside the shopping mall
context. The Court of Appeal, in cases both before and after the Fashion
Valley Mall decision, has fairly consistently declined to extend Pruneyard
to stand-alone retail stores, even when they are part of a larger shop-
ping center, on the ground that they do not include courtyards, plazas, or
other places designed to encourage patrons to spend time together or be
entertained,8 9 and the Supreme Court has declined to review the decisions
in these cases. The Supreme Court has granted review in the most recent
case, Ralph's Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Lo-
cal 8,90 but that case involves additional issues, making it unclear whether
the Court will feel called upon to confront the scope of Pruneyard.91
84 Fashion Valley Mall v. National Labor Relations Board, 42 Cal.4th 850 (2007).
85 Id. at 868.
86 Id. at 870-82 (Chin, Baxter, and Corrigan, JJ., dissenting).
87 Id. at 868-69.
88 Id. at 869.
89 E.g., Van v. Target Corp., 155 Cal.App.4th 1375 (2007); Albertson's, Inc. v.
Young, 107 Cal.App.4th 106 (2003).
90 Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8, 186
Cal.App.4th 1078 (2010).
91 In Pruneyard the Court made clear that even where the principle in that case
applied, expressive activity could be limited by reasonable content-neutral time, place,
and manner rules. In Savage v. Trammel Crow Co., 223 Cal.App.3d 1562 (1990), the
Court of Appeal upheld a prohibition of leafletting in a shopping center's parking lot,
based on evidence that it posed traffic and litter problems, but struck down a prohibition
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V. EXPRESSIVE ACTIVITY ON PUBLIC
PROPERTY: THE FORUM CONTROVERSY
For decades the U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to define the circum-
stances under which the government must yield its property to expressive
activities. The results, in terms of coherence and clarity, leave a good deal
to be desired. In 1983, in Perry Education Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, the U.S. Supreme Court articulated a tripartite categorical approach:
there is the "quintessential public forum," public property which has by
tradition been open to expressive activity, such as streets and parks; the
"designated public forum," public property which the state has voluntarily
opened for such use; and the "nonpublic forum," all other public prop-
erty.92 In the quintessential public forum, speech content regulations are
subject to strict scrutiny, and any time, place, and manner regulations must
be reasonable, must be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant govern-
ment interest," and leave open "ample alternative channels" for speech.93
According to the Court in Perry, the designated public forum is subject
to the same restrictions, except that the government is free to withdraw
the designation.94 In the nonpublic forum, speech may be prohibited or
restricted so long as the regulation is reasonable and viewpoint neutral.95
But then there is Good News Club v. Milford Central School, allowing for a
"limited public forum" that is reserved "for certain groups or for the dis-
cussion of certain topics," provided there is no viewpoint discrimination
and the restriction as to speakers and content is "reasonable in light of the
purpose served by the forum."96
Or so it is said. In applying public forum analysis, however, the U.S.
Supreme Court has encountered considerable difficulty, and has displayed
considerable internal disagreement, over the criteria for determining
on distribution of religious tracts as content based. The Supreme Court has not had oc-
casion to consider the reasonableness of rules in the case of private property.
92 Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983).
93 Id. at 45.
94 Id. at 45-46.
95 Id. at 46.
96 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001) - perhaps
suggesting, contra Perry, that the test for restrictions of speech in limited public forums
is the same as in nonpublic forums.
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whether government must make particular property available for expres-
sive activity, what constitutes content neutrality, and what sorts of time,
place, and manner restrictions are permissible. The Court's pattern of
analysis has provoked a good deal of criticism from academics, and from
some lower courts as well.97 From time to time there have been signs of
movement away from a categorical, and toward a more functional ap-
proach, deemphasizing "tradition" and "designation" in favor of an analy-
sis that takes into account both governmental interests and the interests in
free expression, 98 but the Court has adhered to its tripartite analysis.
There have been some hints of a less categorical, more functional ap-
proach by California courts, beginning with In re Hoffman in 1967. 9 There,
the state Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Traynor, held that
Vietnam War protesters had the right to distribute leaflets in Union Sta-
tion in Los Angeles, reasoning that
a railway station is like a public street or park. Noise and commo-
tion are characteristic of the normal operation of a railway sta-
tion. The railroads seek neither privacy within nor exclusive pos-
session of their station. They therefore cannot invoke the law of
trespass against petitioners to protect those interests .... Nor was
there any other interest that would justify prohibiting petitioners'
activities. 100
The test, the Court said, is "not whether petitioners' use of the station was
a railway use, but whether it interfered with that use." 101 The opinion gives
no separate weight to the fact that the station was owned by three rail-
roads and not by the government, but the reasoning would appear to apply
97 E.g., Daniel A. Farber & John E. Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV. 1219
(1984); Calvin Massey, Public Fora, Neutral Governments, and the Prism of Property, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 309 (1999).
98 In Grayned v. City of Rockford, the Court, while upholding an anti-noise ordi-
nance as a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation, rejected the categorical ap-
proach, using broad language to describe the test as "whether the manner of expression
is basically incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place at a particular
time." 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
99 In re Hoffman, 67 Cal.2d 845 (1967).
100 Id. at 851.
101 Id.
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a fortiori to a government-owned facility. The Court's opinion does not
refer to the state Constitution, but the Supreme Court has since embraced
Hoffman as part of California law.102
In the same year as Hoffman the Court decided Wirta v. Alameda-
Contra Costa Transit District, involving the placement of advertising inside
buses operated by a public transit district.10 3 Commercial advertising was
permitted, but the District refused to accept antiwar ads sponsored by an
organization called Women for Peace, insisting that it would accept political
advertising only at election time, and then only for or against a candidate
or measure on the ballot. The Court held this policy unconstitutional, say-
ing that while the Transit District did not have to allow ads inside buses, if
it made that space available as a forum for commercial advertising it could
not discriminate on the basis of content, and especially against political ad-
vertising, which was entitled to greater constitutional protection.10 4 Again,
the Court's opinion focused on the First Amendment, without mentioning
the California Constitution. Seven years later, in Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, the U.S. Supreme Court reached a contrary conclusion under the
First Amendment.105 In Committee to Defend Reproductive Rights v. Myers,
involving discrimination in the availability of public funding for medical
procedures, the state Court relied on Wirta as a statement of California law,
stating that in Lehman the U.S. Supreme Court "declined to engage in the
demanding scrutiny called for by the California precedents." 106
Two Court of Appeal opinions gave further impetus to the Hoffman
analysis, in the context of publicly owned property. In Prisoners Union v.
Department of Corrections the court held that an organization seeking to
distribute literature concerning prison conditions to persons visiting the
prison was entitled to do so in the prison parking lot.'07 Relying in part
on Grayned, the court held that the question was not whether the property
could be considered a "public forum," but rather whether there was a "basic
102 See Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal.3d 899 (1979).
103 Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 68 Cal.2d 51 (1967).
104 Id. at 63.
105 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
106 Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal.3d 252, 264 (1981).
107 Prisoners Union v. Dep't of Corr., 135 Cal.App.3d 930 (1982). I confess to being
the author of that opinion, a confession especially poignant because the opinion makes
no reference to the California Constitution.
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incompatibility" between the proposed communicative activity and the
intended use of the government property.10 8 Prisoners Union was followed
two years later by the Court of Appeal in U.C. Nuclear Weapons Labs Con-
version Project v. Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, holding that members of
a group protesting nuclear weapons research at the University's laboratory
had a right of access, under the California Constitution, to the laboratory's
visitors center for the purposes of distributing and displaying its literature to
the public. 10 9 Rejecting the federal categorical approach, the court suggested
that the public forum question should be viewed as "a continuum, with pub-
lic streets and parks at one end and government institutions like hospitals
and prisons at the other," using a test of "basic incompatibility."''1
In San Leandro Teachers Ass'n v. San Leandro School District the ques-
tion reached the California Supreme Court."' A teachers' union which
had been designated by teachers in the District as their bargaining rep-
resentative sought to utilize internal school mailboxes to distribute com-
munications to teachers, including endorsement of candidates in school
board elections. The Court first analyzed the case under the federal Con-
stitution, concluding that the mailboxes were a "nonpublic forum," so that
viewpoint-neutral limitations on content, such as the district's no-politics
rule, were permissible under the First Amendment." 2
The Court then proceeded to consider the state Constitution, and the
teachers' arguments that (1) as a matter of state constitutional law the prop-
er test should be, not whether the mailboxes constituted a public forum,
but rather a determination of the proper "balance between the interests of
the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency
of the public services it performs through its employees";113 or (2) if the
108 Id. at 935-36.
109 U.C. Nuclear Weapons Labs Conversion Project v. Lawrence Livermore Lab.,
154 Cal.App.3d 1157 (1984).
110 Id. at 1164. Using the same test, it denied the group's request to be able to show
films or slides in the auditorium of the visitors center.
In San Leandro Teachers Ass'n v. Governing Bd. of the San Leandro Unified Sch.
Dist., 46 Cal.4th 822 (2009).
112 Id. at 842.
113 Id. at 843 (citing L.A. Teachers Union v. L.A. City Bd. of Educ., 71 Cal.2d 551,
558 (1969) (off-duty teachers could not be prohibited from circulating in the faculty
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Court uses forum analysis, it should use the functional analysis suggested
in some prior opinions rather than the more rigid categorical analysis of
the federal courts, and consider whether the use of the mailboxes as pro-
posed would be "basically incompatible" with their principal purpose.
14
As to the first argument the Court questioned whether the decision in
L.A. Teachers Union relied upon the California Constitution as distinguished
from the First Amendment, but in any event distinguished that holding on the
ground that while the faculty lounge and lunchroom in that case were places
in which unrestricted conversations between teachers took place generally,
in the present case the school mailboxes were "dedicated to school business
and, by statute, to union communications with employees."115 The District,
said the Court, "has a legitimate interest in restricting mailbox communica-
tions so as not to permit such mailboxes to become venues for the one-sided
endorsement of political candidates by those with special access."
116
The Court rejected also the second argument, observing that the "ba-
sic incompatibility" test reflected in U.C. Nuclear Weapons Labs had not
been relied upon since that opinion. 117 It also distinguished that case on
the ground that the "primary purpose of the visitors center was the dis-
semination of information about the laboratory and its work," and that the
Court of Appeal in that case determined that "the government had no le-
gitimate interest in monopolizing the dissemination of information about
the laboratory on that site."118 In the present case, the Court reasoned,
the District is "not attempting to monopolize speech regarding political
endorsements in mailboxes," but rather "to disallow use of mailboxes for
one-sided political endorsements," as a "means of promoting an important
lunchroom and lounge a petition for the improvement of education)) and Cal. Teachers
Ass'n v. San Diego Unified. Sch. Dist., 45 Cal.App.4th 1383 (1996) (teachers could be
prohibited from wearing buttons opposing a statewide school voucher initiative while
the teachers were in the classroom, but not in non-instructional settings)).
114 Id. at 842.
115 Id. at843-44.
116 Id. at 844.
117 Id. at 845. The Court also asserted, as had the Court of Appeal, that in Grayned
the concept of "basic incompatibility" was used only after it had been decided that the
government property in question constituted a public forum, in order to determine
whether a given regulation constitutes a reasonable time, place, and manner restric-
tion. Id.
118 Id.
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government interest, i.e., maintaining the integrity of the electoral process
by neutralizing any advantage that those with special access to govern-
ment resources might possess."1 19
The Court's distinctions of prior Court of Appeal opinions, in place of
their outright rejection, led to uncertainty as to the status of public forum
analysis under the California Constitution. That uncertainty has remained.
In International Society of Krishna Consciousness v. City of Los Angeles (ISK-
CON), an organization wishing to solicit immediate donation of funds in the
Los Angeles Airport brought suit in federal court to challenge the constitu-
tional validity of a city ordinance prohibiting such solicitation. 20 Against
the background of a U.S. Supreme Court decision that airports are not pub-
lic fora under the First Amendment, 121 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal
asked the California Supreme Court to answer the question under the state
Constitution. Accepting the certification, the California Court split three
ways. One justice (Kennard) expressed the view that airports are public fora
under the state Constitution, while three justices (Justice Chin, joined by
Justices Corrigan and Baxter) expressed the contrary view.122 The remaining
three justices (Justice Moreno, joined by Justice Werdegar and Chief Justice
George) found it unnecessary to reach that question, deciding instead that
even if airports are public fora under the state Constitution, the ordinance
was not content based, 123 and that it constituted a reasonable time, place,
and manner regulation.124 All seven justices agreed with this conclusion.
It seems clear that the California Supreme Court is not tethered to fed-
eral law when it comes to expression on public property. In Bailey v. Loggins,
for example, it found, beyond federal precedent, that a prison newspaper
119 Id.
120 Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness v. City ofL.A. (ISKCON), 48 Cal.4th 446
(2010).
121 Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
122 ISKCON, 48 Cal.4th at 460-66 (Kennard, Chin, Corrigan, and Baxter, JJ., con-
curring).
123 Id. at 457 (majority opinion). The California Court had previously decided
that a law banning solicitation of funds is content neutral. L.A. Alliance for Survival v.
City of L.A., 22 Cal.4th 352 (2000). It is possible that this view is or may turn out to be
contrary to First Amendment law. If so, it would represent one of the few instances in
which California courts have interpreted the state Constitution to be less protective of
expression than the federal.
124 Id. at 404.
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constituted a limited public forum subject to constitutional protection, so
that prison authorities in deciding what could be printed must exercise their
authority "even-handedly and with sensitivity to the values protected by the
First Amendment and corresponding California constitutional and statu-
tory provisions." 125 Yet, partly through studious avoidance on the part of the
Supreme Court, it remains unclear to what extent California has a different
constitutional approach to expression on public property, and the uncertain-
ty has been amplified by changes in the composition of the Court. 126 The ar-
guments in the opposing opinions of Justices Kennard and Chin in ISKCON
turn in part upon differing interpretations of prior opinions, but more basi-
cally reflect differing views as to the proper balance between allowing the
broadest feasible opportunity for free expression versus competing govern-
mental interests - and to some extent between the desirability of a flexible
approach as contrasted with the advantages of clear rules. Stay tuned.
VI. COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Judging from Gerawan,127 California may have broader protection for com-
mercial speech than the First Amendment provides, at least when it comes
to compelled speech. In a 4-3 opinion by Justice Mosk that comments exten-
sively upon the separateness of California's free speech doctrine, the Court
held that a marketing order issued by the state secretary of food and agri-
culture at the behest of a group of plum producers and handlers, requiring
plum producers to contribute to the advertising of plums, "implicated" free
speech rights under the state Constitution, despite a decision by the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Glickman v. Wileman Brothers.1 28 Glickman upheld a similar
125 Bailey v. Loggins, 32 Cal.3d 907, 922 (1982); see also Lopez v. Tulare Joint Union
High Sch. Dist., 34 Cal.App.4th 1302, 1318-19 (1995) (recognizing that "the California
Supreme Court has taken a different approach than the U.S. Supreme Court when ana-
lyzing the government's ability to regulate the content of its own sponsored publica-
tions," and on the basis of Bailey finding a school newspaper to constitute a limited
public forum subject to constitutional protection).
126 Since ISKCON, Chief Justice George and Justice Moreno have both left the
Court, replaced by Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and Justice Liu.
127 Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons, 24 Cal.4th 468, 509-17; see also supra notes
74-75 and accompanying text.
128 Gerawan, 24 Cal.4th at 517 (citing People v. Teresinski, 30 Cal.3d 822, 836
(1982) and discussing Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457 (1997)).
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order by the U.S. secretary of agriculture against First Amendment attack.
Referring to the Teresinski factors in support of the divergence, Justice Mosk
pointed to the fact that Glickman was a 5-4 opinion, that it had been sub-
ject to extensive scholarly criticism, and that both textual and historical dif-
ferences supported a different result.129 As to historical differences, Justice
Mosk observed that in the California of 1849 "the prevailing political, legal
and social culture was that of Jacksonian democracy," animated by a spirit
of individualism which "presupposed and produced.., unrestrained speech
about economic matters generally, including... commercial affairs."130
And, he explained, the right to free speech is "put at risk both by prohibiting
a speaker from funding speech that he otherwise would fund and also by
compelling him to fund speech that he otherwise would not fund."131 The
dissenters, led by Chief Justice George, insisted there was no justification
for interpreting article I, section 2(a) so as to afford a greater right "to obtain
'free rider' status with respect to such generic advertising." t 32
The majority opinion in Gerawan stops short of declaring the mar-
keting order unconstitutional, however, instead remanding to the Court
of Appeal to determine, inter alia, "what protection, precisely, article I
afford[s] commercial speech, at what level, of what kind and.. . subject to
what test";133 and the subsequent history of the case, as well as the sub-
sequent history of the Glickman opinion, leaves the relationship between
state and federal law in this area decidedly muddy.
VII. ARTICLE I, SECTION 2:
NEWSPERSON IMMUNITY
In Branzburg v. Hayes the U.S. Supreme Court declined to recognize a First
Amendment right on the part of media reporters to resist subpoenas that
require disclosure of confidential sources. 3 4 Justice Powell, who joined
the plurality opinion to that effect, wrote a separate concurring opinion
129 Id, at 501-12.
130 Id. at 495.
131 Id. at 491.
132 Id. at 518 (George, C.J., dissenting).
133 Id. at 517 (majority opinion).
134 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
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suggesting that a balancing test be used in particular cases. 135 Whether or
not the net result is that there exists a limited First Amendment privilege
for reporters is a question over which lower courts have divided.
136
In 1980, in the wake of Branzburg, California voters approved a state
constitutional amendment proposed by the Assembly which renumbered
the existing article I, section 2 to section 2(a) and added a subsection (b),
which has the effect of protecting a newsperson from being adjudged in
contempt for refusing to disclose either (1) unpublished information or (2)
the source of information, whether published or unpublished.
1 37
135 Id. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
136 The California Supreme Court, in Mitchell v. Superior Court, concurred in
the observation by some other courts that Justice Powell's position was the "minimum
common denominator" of Branzburg, so that the decision does not preclude a qualified
privilege, but stops short of deciding whether Branzburg requires such a privilege. 37
Cal.3d 268, 277-79 (1984).
137 Subsection 2(b) reads:
(b) A publisher, editor, reporter, or other person connected with or em-
ployed upon a newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, or by a
press association or wire service, or any person who has been so connected
or employed, shall not be adjudged in contempt by a judicial, legislative, or
administrative body, or any other body having the power to issue subpoenas,
for refusing to disclose the source of any information procured while so con-
nected or employed for publication in a newspaper, magazine or other peri-
odical publication, or for refusing to disclose any unpublished information
obtained or prepared in gathering, receiving or processing of information for
communication to the public.
Nor shall a radio or television news reporter or other person connected
with or employed by a radio or television station, or any person who has been
so connected or employed, be so adjudged in contempt for refusing to disclose
the source of any information procured while so connected or employed for
news or news commentary purposes on radio or television, or for refusing to
disclose any unpublished information obtained or prepared in gathering, re-
ceiving or processing of information for communication to the public.
As used in this subdivision, "unpublished information" includes infor-
mation not disseminated to the public by the person from whom disclosure
is sought, whether or not related information has been disseminated and in-
cludes, but is not limited to, all notes, outtakes, photographs, tapes or other
data of whatever sort not itself disseminated to the public through a medium
of communication, whether or not published information based upon or re-
lated to such material has been disseminated.
CAL. CONST. art. I § 2(b).
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In various cases the California Supreme Court has held (1) that the
broad definition of "unpublished information" does not require a show-
ing by the newsperson that the information was obtained in confidence; 138
(2) that a newsperson's protection under the shield law "must yield to a
criminal defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial when the news-
person's refusal to disclose information would unduly infringe on that
right";139 (3) that there is no similar requirement for accommodation in
a civil action; 140 (4) that the prosecution in a criminal proceeding cannot
insist upon such balancing based upon the people's right to due process
under article I, section 19 of the California Constitution, since the "ab-
soluteness of the immunity embodied in the shield law only yields to a
conflicting federal constitutional ... right";141 and (5) that since the shield
law by its terms provides only an immunity from contempt, and not a
privilege, extraordinary writ relief is available only after a judgment for
contempt has been entered, and a trial court may impose sanctions other
than contempt, including monetary sanctions provided by section 1992 of
the California Civil Procedure Code. 142
VIII. ARTICLE 1, SECTION 3:
THE RIGHT TO ASSEMBLE AND PETITION
Article I, section 10 of the 1849 Constitution provided that "[t]he people
shall have the right to freely assemble together, to consult for the common
good, to instruct their representatives, and to petition the legislature for
redress of grievances." In 1974, pursuant to recommendations by the Con-
stitution Revision Commission, the section was renumbered as article I,
138 Delaney v. Super. Ct., 50 Cal.3d 785, 798 (1990).
139 Id. at 793.
140 New York Times Co. v. Super. Ct., 51 Cal.3d 453, 462 (1990).
141 Miller v. Super. Ct., 21 Cal.4th 883, 901 (1999).
142 New York Times, 51 Cal.3d at 458-61. Observing that the monetary sanctions
under section 1992 are limited (up to $500 forfeiture plus actual damages) and are ob-
tainable only in an independent action, and are "not effective as a practical matter" so
that "contempt is generally the only effective remedy against a nonparty witness," the
Court rejected the newsperson's argument that the operation of section 1992 would
frustrate the purposes of the shield law. Id. at 461, 464; CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 1992
(2011).
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section 3 and amended to its present form: "The people have the right to in-
struct their representatives, petition government for redress of grievances,
and assemble freely to consult for the common good." The Commission
report explained that the section was being broadened to clarify that the
right of petition extends beyond the Legislature to include other branches
of the government.143
The earliest application of this provision came at the turn of the cen-
tury, in connection with an 1899 primary election law that prohibited the
election of delegates to a convention of any political party not representing
three percent of the votes cast at the previous election. 144 Characterizing
the law as a discrimination against minority parties, the Supreme Court
relied upon the original provision, along with other provisions of the
state Constitution, to hold the law unconstitutional. 145 For the next three
quarters of a century California courts treated the provision as if it merely
replicated the First Amendment's analogous protection for assembly and
petition,146 sometimes citing the state language but relying primarily on
U.S. Supreme Court decisions for the analysis.
The California Supreme Court's opinion in Pruneyard, however, relied
in part upon the state constitutional rights of assembly and petition to sup-
port its holding that the state Constitution protects rights of expression on
nongovernmental property beyond any protection provided by the federal
Constitution. And in City of Long Beach v. Bozek the Court, in an opinion
by Justice Mosk, cited this provision in holding that the right to petition
includes an absolute privilege to file a lawsuit against a government en-
tity without fear of a malicious prosecution lawsuit. 147 The opinion makes
reference to both federal and state constitutional provisions, giving rise
to grant of certiorari by the U.S. Supreme Court. That Court vacated the
opinion and sent the case back for clarification as to whether it was decided
on federal or state grounds. On remand, the California Supreme Court
143 JOSEPH R. GRODIN, CALVIN MASSEY & RICHARD CUNNINGHAM, THE CALI-
FORNIA STATE CONSTITUTION 42 (Oxford Univ. Press 2011) (1993).
144 Britton v. Bd. of Election Comm'rs, 129 Cal. 337 (1900).
145 Id.
146 "Congress shall make no law... abridging.., the right of the people peaceably
to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
147 City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 31 Cal.3d 527 (1982).
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confirmed that the opinion was supported independently by the state Con-
stitution, and reiterated its prior opinion. 148
The California Supreme Court has not addressed this provision since
Bozek, and the cases in the Court of Appeal that have cited to Bozek have
involved actions for malicious prosecution. The potential exists for appli-
cation of this provision in other contexts, but neither courts nor litigants
appear to be giving it much attention.
IX. ARTICLE I, SECTION 3(B):
PUBLIC RIGHT OF ACCESS TO INFORMATION
The argument has often been made that the rights protected by the First
Amendment should include a public right of access to government places
and papers, as a means of enhancing the values of self-governance, which
it is one of the functions of the First Amendment to preserve. The U.S. Su-
preme Court recognized a limited right of access under the First Amend-
ment to court proceedings, 49 but has otherwise proved unwilling to ex-
pand that right, for example to prisons. 150
Many states, however, including California, have imposed upon gov-
ernment an obligation to allow broad public access to meetings and papers
through statutes. In 2004 California voters went further, approving a legis-
latively proposed constitutional amendment, Proposition 59 on that year's
ballot, which establishes a state constitutional right of access "to informa-
tion concerning the conduct of the people's business," including "the meet-
ings of public bodies and the writings of public officials and agencies."' 151
148 City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 33 Cal.3d 727 (1983).
149 Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980) (right to attend crimi-
nal trials held to be implicit in the First Amendment); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Super.
Ct., 457 U.S. 596 (1982) (closure requires compelling government interest and narrow
tailoring); cf Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984) (press has no right of
access to documents subject to protective order in civil proceeding).
150 The Court has held that the press has no First Amendment right to visit in-
mates (Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Saxbe v. Wash. Post Co., 417 U.S. 843
(1974)) or to inspect jail conditions (Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978)).
151 CAL. CONST. art. I, § 3(b) provides:
(1) The people have the right of access to information concerning the conduct
of the people's business, and, therefore, the meetings of public bodies and the
writings of public officials and agencies shall be open to public scrutiny.
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It is unclear to what extent Proposition 59 changed previous law. The
ballot argument in support of the proposition asserts that existing dis-
closure laws "have been eroded by special interest legislation, by courts
putting the burden on the public to justify disclosure, and by government
officials who want to avoid scrutiny and keep secrets."' 15 2 The Legislative
Analyst's summary which accompanied the measure states that "[a]s a re-
sult, a government entity would have to demonstrate to a somewhat greater
extent than under current law why information requested by the public
(2) A statute, court rule, or other authority, including those in effect on the
effective date of this subdivision, shall be broadly construed if it furthers
the people's right of access, and narrowly construed if it limits the right of
access. A statute, court rule, or other authority adopted after the effective date
of this subdivision that limits the right of access shall be adopted with find-
ings demonstrating the interest protected by the limitation and the need for
protecting that interest.
(3) Nothing in this subdivision supersedes or modifies the right of privacy
guaranteed by Section 1 or affects the construction of any statute, court rule,
or other authority to the extent that it protects that right to privacy, including
any statutory procedures governing discovery or disclosure of information
concerning the official performance or professional qualifications of a peace
officer.
(4) Nothing in this subdivision supersedes or modifies any provision of this
Constitution, including the guarantees that a person may not be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or denied equal protection
of the laws, as provided in Section 7.
(5) This subdivision does not repeal or nullify, expressly or by implication, any
constitutional or statutory exception to the right of access to public records or
meetings of public bodies that is in effect on the effective date of this subdivi-
sion, including, but not limited to, any statute protecting the confidentiality of
law enforcement and prosecution records.
(6) Nothing in this subdivision repeals, nullifies, supersedes, or modifies pro-
tections for the confidentiality of proceedings and records of the Legislature,
the Members of the Legislature, and its employees, committees, and caucuses
provided by Section 7 of Article IV, state law, or legislative rules adopted in
furtherance of those provisions; nor does it affect the scope of permitted dis-
covery in judicial or administrative proceedings regarding deliberations of
the Legislature, the Members of the Legislature, and its employees, commit-
tees, and caucuses.
152 November 2004 Official Voter Information Guide, Proposition 59 Arguments and
Rebuttals, available at http://vote2004.sos.ca.gov/propositions/prop59-arguments.htm.
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should be kept private. Over time, this change could result in additional
government documents being available to the public." 5 3 Thus far, the few
appellate court opinions that have considered Proposition 59 have not pro-
vided much enlightenment. 154
X. SOME THOUGHTS ON METHODOLOGY
While there is a growing recognition on the part of judges and lawyers,
and for that matter the public generally, that state constitutions have an
important role in the protection of what we call "constitutional rights,"
questions remain as to the methodology for interpreting the relevant con-
stitutional provisions - in particular the role to be played, if any, by U.S.
Supreme Court decisions under the federal Constitution. 155 Despite the
fact that state and federal constitutional protection for civil rights and lib-
erties have different historical roots - often, but not always, reflected in
differences in language - it has often proved tempting for a state court to
rely heavily on federal precedent, especially when there is a dearth of state
authority.
In recent years California courts, in the context of free speech, have
been relatively resistant to that temptation. From time to time an opin-
ion will cite the comment in a 1938 opinion, Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker,
to the effect that "cogent reasons" must exist for departing from the U.S.
Supreme Court's interpretation of a "similar provision" in the federal
Constitution; 5 6 but Gabrielli provided no explanation for such a rule,
153 November 2004 Official Voter Information Guide, Proposition 59 Analysis by
the Legislative Analyst, available at http://vote2004.sos.ca.gov/propositions/prop59-
analysis.htm.
'54 See Mercury Interactive Corp. v. Klein, 158 Cal.App.4th 60 (2007) (declining
to construe article I, section 3 as establishing a right of access to sealed court docu-
ments beyond existing law).
155 Disagreement over the proper role of U.S. Supreme Court opinions in state
constitutional interpretation has provoked a plethora of scholarly and judicial opinion,
and I do not undertake to provide a general evaluation here. For an excellent source, see
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS (2009).
156 E.g., Edelstein v. City and Cnty. of S.F., 29 Cal.4th 164, 168 (2002) (citing People
v. Monge, 16 Cal.4th 826, 844 (1997), which in turn cites Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 12
Cal.2d 85, 89 (1938)). See also Raven v. Deukmejian, 52 Cal.3d 336, 353 (1990) (listing
cases).
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other than to cite to several decisions from other states which in turn con-
tained no explanation. Moreover, Gabrielli illustrates one of the dangers in
such a rule. The case involved an attack under both federal and state con-
stitutions against a flag salute requirement in public schools. The Court,
.pointing to several cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court had summarily
affirmed state court decisions upholding such requirements, declared that
the issue under the federal Constitution "is no longer open."'5 7 Five years
later the high court announced its 8-1 decision in West Virginia Board of
Education v. Barnette holding a compulsory flag salute to violate several
provisions of the federal Constitution, thus leaving the state Constitution
with lesser protection for liberty.15 8
In 1982, in People v. Teresinski, the California Supreme Court, reiter-
ating the dogma that decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court are entitled to
"respectful consideration... and ought to be followed unless persuasive
reasons are presented for taking a different course,"15 9 set out a list of fac-
tors, considered in prior cases, relevant to that determination. These in-
clude whether there are differences in "language or history"; whether the
most recent opinion of the high court represents a limitation on rights es-
tablished by earlier precedent "in a manner inconsistent with the spirit of
the earlier opinion"; the "vigor" of any dissenting opinion or "incisive aca-
demic criticism"; and whether adherence to the federal precedent would
overturn established California doctrine affording greater rights. 160 Teres-
inski was an illegal search case, and in free speech cases what have become
known as the "Teresinksi factors" are seldom mentioned. 16
1
Certainly the Teresinski factors are broad and vague enough to allow
for considerable flexibility in deciding state constitutional issues, but the
question remains, and is seldom asked, why federal precedents should be
entitled to any deference at all, beyond respectful consideration of the rea-
soning which they contain. Perhaps an argument can be constructed on
the basis of uniformity: people, especially those who are not lawyers, may
157 Gabrielli, 12 Cal.2d at 89.
158 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
159 People v. Teresinski, 30 Cal.3d 822, 836 (1982).
160 Id. at 836-37.
161 An exception is Gerawan Farming, Inc. v. Lyons. See supra notes 130-37 and
accompanying text.
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find it difficult to understand why "constitutional rights" should vary from
one state to another. Our commitment to the idea that as a nation we are
joined by common concepts of rights that are in some meaningful sense
"fundamental" is arguably weakened by such diversity. In some contexts
there may be some value in uniformity per se, as a means, for example, of
avoiding confusion on the part of those whose activities take them across
state lines, 62 though that problem arises equally in situations where there
are differences in state statutory or common law. Finally, it may be simpler
and less controversial, when there are clear federal precedents pointing
to unconstitutionality, for a state court to rely on those precedents rather
than break new state constitutional ground. But whether these arguable
advantages outweigh the disadvantages of deference - including the con-
strictions on the development of state constitutional jurisprudence and the
risk of changes in federal law, not to mention the awkwardness which re-
sults when the high court disagrees - is highly questionable.
It has been pointed out that the history of California's free speech pro-
vision offers little guidance as to how it should be interpreted, but this is
true of the First Amendment as well. When the U.S. Supreme Court em-
barked upon the development of First Amendment jurisprudence in the
middle of the twentieth century it had little to rely upon other than its own
reasoning and assessment concerning the place of free expression in a free
society, the weight to be given other societal values, and the relative roles
of the courts and legislatures. With respect to issues such as those raised
in Pruneyard there is the added dimension of private property rights. The
judicial task is a demanding one, but it is no more demanding for state
courts than for federal.
The California Supreme Court has frequently observed, for example
in Los Angeles Alliance for Survival, that the fact that the state provision
is worded more expansively and has been interpreted as being more pro-
tective than the First Amendment does not mean it is broader in all its
162 See, e.g., Int'l Soc'y of Krishna Consciousness v. City of L.A., 48 Cal.4th 446,
464 (2010) (Chin, J., concurring) ("The public, litigators, and government attorneys ad-
vising their clients need a clear, consistent 'public forum' doctrine in cases arising on
public property, not seemingly random fluctuations between state and federal consti-
tutional law.").
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applications. 6 3 But whether or not it should be so interpreted ought to
depend upon independent analysis rather than upon some presumption
in favor of the federal rule, as Chief Justice George's opinion in that case
demonstrates. The issue was whether a regulation of solicitation should be
viewed as content based or content neutral under the free speech provi-
sions of the state Constitution. After setting out the history of California's
free speech provisions and acknowledging their support for a higher level
of protection in many contexts, the opinion carefully examines both the
history of solicitation regulations in California and the theoretical foun-
dations of the content-based doctrine concluding, contrary to a Court of
Appeal opinion which is criticized and disapproved, that such regulations
should not be viewed as content based.164 The fact that the U.S. Supreme
Court happened to reach the same conclusion was secondary, and not a
principal focus of the Chief Justice's opinion. As the Court put it in a dif-
ferent context:
[S]uch independent construction does not represent an unprin-
cipled exercise of power, but a means of fulfilling our solemn and
independent constitutional obligation to interpret the safeguards
guaranteed by the California Constitution in a manner consis-
tent with the governing principles of California law.... [J]ust as
the United States Supreme Court bears the ultimate judicial re-
sponsibility for determining matters of federal law, this court
bears the ultimate responsibility for resolving questions of state law,
including the proper interpretation of provisions of the state
163 L.A. Alliance for Survival v. City of L.A., 22 Cal.4th 352, 367 (2000). There
are numerous instances in which the Court has upheld limitations on speech under
both constitutions. E.g., Aguilar v. Avis Rent A Car Sys., 21 Cal.4th 121 (1999) (up-
holding an injunction against repetition of harassing statements found to violate the
California Fair Employment and Housing Act, distinguishing the early prior restraint
case of Dailey v. Super. Ct., 112 Cal. 94, 96 (1896) on the ground that it did not involve
speech already determined to be unlawful); cf Brown v. Kelly Broad. Co., 48 Cal.3d 711
(1989) (relying on distinctive wording of article I, section 2 as a reason for not extending
the federal rule requiring malice in defamation actions on the part of public figures to
private persons: "The federal Constitution, by contrast, contains no express provision
imposing responsibility for abuse of the right of free speech. This difference refutes de-
fendants' policy argument that our state Constitution weighs in favor of a standard of
fault higher than that required under the federal Constitution.").
164 L.A. Alliance for Survival, 22 Cal.4th 352.
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Constitution. In fulfilling this difficult and grave responsibility,
we cannot properly relegate our task to the judicial guardians of
the federal Constitution, but instead must recognize our personal
obligation to exercise independent legal judgment in ascertaining
the meaning and application of state constitutional provisions. 165
165 Comm. to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal.3d 252, 261-62 (1981) (quot-
ing People v. Chavez, 26 Cal.3d 334, 352 (1980)). The Court has not been entirely con-
sistent in following these principles of independent construction. For example, in Edel-
stein v. City and County of San Francisco, the Court partially overruled a prior decision
that held a ban on write-in voting in municipal elections to violate article I, section
2 as well as the First Amendment. 29 Cal.4th 164 (2002). The Edelstein court based
its decision on a subsequent U.S. Supreme Court decision upholding, against a federal
constitutional challenge, an even broader ban. Id. at 168 (citing Burdick v. Takushi,
504 U.S. 428 (1992)). The Court acknowledged that the explanation for the divergence
between the prior California case and the subsequent federal case was that the prior
state decision "placed a higher value than the Burdick court on... the 'expressive func-
tion' of voting," but instead of saying that this represented a legitimate difference which
justified a different state rule, or that the majority simply disagreed with the value as-
sessment in the prior decision and on that basis declined to follow it, the majority ex-
plained its decision by saying there were no "cogent reasons" for departing from the
federal rule. Id. Compare Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Ctr., 23 Cal.3d 899, 908 (1979)
("The fact that those [state] opinions cited federal law that subsequently took a diver-
gent course does not diminish their usefulness as precedent.").
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